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This chapter sets out the late eighteenth-century background to the emergence 
of ‘faith and reason’ as a composite pair, framed by the apparent Kantian 
disjunction between faith and reason. The author shows first that Kant’s denial 
of knowledge is far from a clear-cut statement of an either/or contrast of faith 
and reason, and, second, that it is the characteristically Kantian gesture of 
‘making room’ that sets the agenda. The second section traces the relation of 
faith and reason as a dyadic pair in Schleiermacher, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and 
Nietzsche. A final section considers the legacy of the nineteenth-century 
model, notably the extent to which it provided the groundwork for the self-
perception of the generation who came of age at the turn of the century that 
theirs was a time of crisis in which the composite model of ‘faith and reason’ 
split open into the distinctively twentieth-century model of ‘faith or reason’. 
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Chapter 9 - Faith and Reason 
Russell Re Manning 
 
Reason has always existed, just not always in a reasonable form. 
Karl Marx, Letter to Arnold Ruge, 1843 
Modelling Relations of ‘Faith and Reason’ 
There is a standard story told of the relation of faith and reason in the 
nineteenth century—one of conflict. This accepted narrative has a lot in 
common with the related story of the relation between religion and science in 
the same period. And, just as the latter has recently—and persuasively—been 
exposed as an ideological myth, so too the ‘conflict thesis’ of faith and reason 
should be abandoned. If, as this chapter proposes, we let go of the untenable 
hypothesis of a nineteenth-century conflict of faith and reason, then so too 
ought we to jettison that other prevalent trope of histories of the period, 
notably that of ‘challenge and response’; wherein the challenges are always 
those of advancing or encroaching reason and the responses those of 
accommodating or resistant faith. 
Perhaps instead a ‘complexity thesis’ commends itself: such were the 
many and various relations between faith and reason in the period from 
Waterloo to Verdun that no one single organizing narrative can be adequate. 
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Of course, no one can deny the distinctive local colourings of nineteenth-
century Christian thought—a period in which Christian thought became truly 
global and subject to a previously unprecedented range of contexts and 
circumstances. As the editors of a late twentieth-century standard 
collaborative work on nineteenth-century religious thought in the West (in 
three volumes) put it, ‘the nineteenth century tells no single story’ (Smart et al. 
1985, 1.2). A truly representative account of the myriad engagements with 
faith and reason in this period would surely necessitate the spinning together 
of numerous diverse and by no means mutually compatible strands, all 
appropriately contextualized to make clear the complexity of the subject. 
Unfortunately, such a treatment is not only beyond the scope of this chapter—
and the competence of any one author—but is equally unsatisfactory, in as 
much as its interpretive usefulness would be severely limited. Without doubt it 
is crucial that discussions of abstract notions, such as faith and reason, and of 
their relations in any given historical time frame, be appropriately 
contextualized and cognizant of the very real divergences within the period. 
And yet, if the—admittedly conventional and artificial—periodization is to be 
anything other than simply an administrative line in the sand, then something 
more must be said about the relations between faith and reason in nineteenth-
century Christian thought than simply that they were many and complex. 
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Accordingly, it will be the burden of this chapter to suggest an 
alternative intellectual history of this topic. In short, my argument will be that 
the relation between faith and reason—in the predominant senses in which 
they were understood during the nineteenth century—was one of a composite 
pair. In other words, the terms ‘faith’ and ‘reason’ and the composite ‘faith 
and reason’ in nineteenth-century Christian thought are not instances of 
perennial notions caught in the spotlight of a historical enquiry restricted only 
by the scope of its time frame. Rather, to put it perhaps more provocatively, 
the very idea of ‘faith and reason’ as a composite or coincident pair is a 
distinctive invention and further a defining characteristic of nineteenth-century 
Christian thought. ‘Faith and reason’ belongs to nineteenth-century Christian 
thought just as distinctively as ‘justification by faith’ belongs to Reformation 
thought and fides quaerens intellectum belongs to (early) medieval Christian 
thought. 
This chapter will proceed by first setting out the late eighteenth-
century background to the emergence of ‘faith and reason’ as a composite 
pair, framed by the apparent Kantian disjunction between faith and reason 
famously encapsulated in the Preface to his Critique of Pure Reason: ‘I had to 
deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’ (Kant 1977, B xxx). In this 
section, I show first that Kant’s denial of knowledge (not reason) is far from a 
clear-cut statement of an either/or contrast of faith and reason, and, second, 
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that it is the characteristically Kantian gesture of ‘making room’ that sets the 
agenda for the development of the relation between faith and reason in the 
century following his announcement of a Copernican revolution in 
philosophy. My second section will trace the relation of faith and reason as a 
dyadic pair in some of the key voices in nineteenth-century Christian thought, 
i.e., Schleiermacher, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. A final, brief section 
considers the legacy of the nineteenth-century model of faith and reason, 
notably the extent to which it provided the groundwork for the self-perception 
of the generation who came of age at the turn of the century that theirs was a 
time of crisis in which the composite model of ‘faith and reason’ split open 
into the distinctively twentieth-century model of ‘faith or reason’. 
Before ‘Faith and Reason’ 
‘Reason then Faith’ 
The eighteenth century bequeathed to the nineteenth a profoundly ambiguous 
understanding of the relations of faith and reason. More precisely, two 
(incompatible) approaches dominated Christian thought in the period from the 
Glorious Revolution in 1688 up to the French Revolution in 1789; two 
approaches that became fused in the nineteenth century into the composition 
of ‘faith and reason’. We might name the two eighteenth-century alternatives 
the ‘faith then reason’ and the ‘no relation’ approaches, both of which are 
Page 6 of 38 
 
themselves clearly reactions to the previously dominant model of what we 
might call ‘reason then faith’; epitomized by the so-called praeambula fidei of 
late-medieval Scholasticism, in which reason was used to demonstrate the 
existence of God and other such truths knowable to unaided human reason as a 
preliminary to the faithful articulation of those truths knowable only by 
revelation. Most famously associated with Aquinas and his characterization of 
philosophy as the ‘handmaiden’ of theology (ancilla theologiae), this 
approach to faith and reason had survived the upheavals of the Protestant 
Reformation and remained unchallenged as one of the foundational pillars of 
the characteristic ‘natural theology’ that grew to prominence through the 
seventeenth century in response to the ever-developing capacity of ‘scientific’ 
reason. Their science may have been different (‘experiential’ rather than 
‘book-learned’), but the early modern natural theologians shared with their 
Scholastic predecessors the conviction that reason is a necessary but 
insufficient preliminary to faith. Referring to the former as ‘natural religion’, 
Robert Boyle, for instance, insisted that 
Natural Religion, is the first that is embraced by the mind, so it 
is the foundation, upon which revealed religion ought to be 
superstructe . . . as it were the stock, upon which Christianity 
might be ingrafted. For I readily acknowledge natural religion 
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to be insufficient, yet I think it very necessary. (Boyle 1690–91, 
2nd part, 685–6) 
This view of the relations between faith and reason as a progression was 
defended explicitly at the outset of the eighteenth century by Gottfried 
Leibniz, who appended a ‘Preliminary Discourse of the Conformity of Faith 
with Reason’ to his 1710 Essais de théodicée. Here Leibniz reaffirmed the 
‘reason then faith’ approach against an alternative position that had arisen as a 
consequence of the Reformation and which he assigned to the Calvinist Pierre 
Bayle. Leibniz wrote: 
I begin with the preliminary question of the conformity of faith 
with reason, and the use of philosophy in theology, because it 
has much influence on the main subject of my treatise, and 
because M. Bayle introduces it everywhere. I assume that two 
truths cannot contradict each other; that the object of faith is the 
truth God has revealed in an extraordinary way; and that reason 
is the linking together of truths, but especially (when it is 
compared with faith) of those whereto the human mind can 
attain naturally without being aided by the light of faith. 
(Leibniz 1951, 73) 
What Leibniz objects to in Bayle is the latter’s denial that reason (philosophy) 
has any place in theology on account of our total depravity as a consequence 
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of the Fall. For Bayle, human reason was ‘a principle of destruction, and not 
of edification’ (Bayle 1697RRM: No need for volume number for Bayle quotations., 2026), 
which could not but lead humanity astray in its inconstancy. Precisely because 
of reason’s tendency towards scepticism and its ability to be put to use to 
prove apparently contradictory claims, he characterized it as ‘a true Penelope 
which during the night unravels the fabric weaved during the day’ (Bayle 
1697, 740), and hence refused to allow it any role in settling substantive 
theological questions, such as those of the existence and nature of God. Far 
from a necessary but insufficient prolegomenon to faith, for Bayle and others 
influenced by the total depravity strand of Reformed theology, reason was 
considered a superfluous and potentially harmful unnecessary addition to 
faith. Bayle’s fideism (if indeed he held fast to its implications) represented a 
firm rejection of the previous ‘reason then faith’ model; it also paved the way 
for the two models more characteristic of the eighteenth century, which in turn 
set the scene for the emergence in the nineteenth century of the distinctive 
‘faith and reason’ model: ‘faith then reason’ and ‘no relation’. 
‘Faith then Reason’ 
Much has been written about the theological views of David Hume, and his 
use of the dialogue format only serves to compound the confusion. What is 
clear, however, is that Hume is no straightforward atheist, and that his primary 
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concern in his writings on theological matters is to warn against excessive 
confidence in the use of reason—whether in the form of Demea’s rationalism 
or Cleanthes’ reliance on the findings of the new natural philosophy. For 
Hume, the dictums that ‘reason alone can never be a motive to any action of 
the will’ (Hume 2007, 413) and ‘reason can never oppose passion in the 
direction of the will’ (Hume 2007, 413) apply just as much to matters of 
religion as they do to morality (we will see later how morality and religion are 
brought together, albeit in a very different estimation, by Kant), such that it is 
faith—a passionate conviction—that has priority in religion, to be followed by 
reason. Effectively reversing the order of progression of the natural 
theologians, Hume famously contends that 
On the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian religion was 
not only at first attended by miracles, but even at this day 
cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere 
reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity, and 
whoever is moved by FAITH to assent to it is conscious of a 
continual miracle in his own person, which subverts all the 
principles of his understanding and gives him a determination 
to believe what is most contrary to custom and practice. (Hume 
1975, 10.2.41) 
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To twenty-first-century readers this may seem nothing other than a damning 
exposé of the credulity of the believers (which it may well be), but what is 
striking here is the way in which Hume, like Boyle, affirms the insufficiency 
of reason, but with the crucial distinction that for Hume it is reason that is the 
‘superstructe’ and faith that is the necessary foundation for Christianity. 
Consistent with Bayle’s fideism, Hume’s scepticism stands firmly against the 
pretensions of the natural theologians to come to theological conclusions 
through the use of reason without recourse to faithful embrace of revelation; 
against Bayle’s insistence on the invulnerability of revelation to reason 
(reason being too weak ever to dispute the truth from God), Hume extends his 
scepticism to the articles of faith. After all, Hume both affirms that the 
Christian religion was founded and is sustained by miracles and that ‘there is 
not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of 
men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure 
us against all delusion in themselves’ (Hume 1975, 10.2.14–15). For Hume, 
‘belief in revealed religion could only amount to fideism’ (Antognazza 2014, 
152), and given the inability of reason to establish religious certainty, such 
fideism (faith then reason) is the only approach to religion. Reason is not 
wholly banished from theological reflection, but its role is certainly limited. 
Hume clarifies the role of reason in religion in his earlier Natural 
History of Religion (1757), in which he clearly distinguishes two questions: 
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the ‘foundation of religion in reason, and that concerning its origin in human 
nature’ (Hume 1993, 135). In this work, Hume claims an ‘obvious’ and 
‘clearest’ solution to the first question in his assurance that ‘the whole frame 
of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after 
serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary 
principles of Theism and Religion’ (Hume 1993, 135)—an assertion which he 
seemingly retracts in the closing section of the Dialogues with Philo’s famous 
admission that ‘a purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most 
careless, the most stupid thinker, and no man can be so hardened in absurd 
systems, as at all times to reject it’ (Hume 1993, 116). What these apparent 
concessions to reason conceal, however, is that the philosophical foundation 
of religion is not the same as its origination in human nature. Reason may—
just—be able to discern the ‘primary principles’ of the existence and nature of 
God, but this ‘attenuated deism’ (what Hume seems to mean by ‘true 
religion’) can hardly account for the historical reality of religion. Here, once 
again, it is emotion that is key—specifically, for Hume the emotions of hope 
and fear—and as before, it is clear that reason’s role is decidedly secondary to 
that of faith: 
Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed 
in the world. You will scarcely be persuaded, that they are 
anything but sick men’s dreams: Or perhaps will regard them 
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more as the playsome whimsies of monkies in human shape, 
than the serious, positive, dogmatical asseverations of a being, 
who dignifies himself with the name of rational. (Hume 1993, 
184) 
‘No Relation’ 
While Hume’s position is a distinctive eighteenth-century reversal of the 
traditional Christian order of progression of ‘reason then faith’, perhaps the 
dominant model of the relations between faith and reason in that century was 
one of ‘no relation’. According to this widely held view, faith and reason 
should not really be considered together as a relatable pair at all. Spinoza set 
the tone for this rejection of any relation of faith and reason: 
[B]etween faith and theology on the one side and philosophy 
on the other there is no relation and no affinity . . . they are as 
far apart as can be. The aim of philosophy is, quite simply, 
truth, while the aim of faith . . . is nothing other than obedience 
and piety. (Spinoza 2002, III.519) 
For Spinoza, faith as characteristic of theology has nothing whatsoever to do 
with reason—and hence with the knowledge and understanding that come 
from philosophical enquiry. Theological questions, such as the existence and 
nature of God are, accordingly, removed from the domain of theology per se 
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(in which they are simply matters of pious obedience to alleged—and 
unsubstantiable—revelation) and become instead proper to philosophy. In 
effect, the epistemic status of faith is evacuated and the distinction between 
faith and reason collapsed into reason alone. What remains for faith is nothing 
more than a subjective assent to revelation—precisely the dangerous 
enthusiasm that was held responsible for the deadly wars of religion that 
followed from the Reformation. 
Similar to Spinoza, John Locke too rejected the idea that faith and 
reason were in any way comparable, even as opposites. For Locke, faith was 
reduced simply to ‘the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the 
deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from 
God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering 
truths to me, we call revelation’ (Locke 1975, 4.18.2). By contrast, reason was 
a kind of ‘natural revelation’ (Locke 1975, 4.19.4), in effect taking on the 
positive epistemic role of faith and removing almost any place for faith in 
theological questions—neither ‘reason then faith’ nor ‘faith then reason’, but 
simply ‘no relation’ between faith and reason. This model is further developed 
by those known to history as ‘deists’, notably John Toland and Matthew 
Tindal. Toland’s 1696 work Christianity not mysterious; or A Treatise 
Shewing, That There Is nothing in the Gospel Contrary to Reason, Nor above 
It, as its title indicates, rejects even the limited epistemic status Locke had 
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reserved for faith in his rejection of the carefully wrought distinction between 
‘contrary to’ and ‘above’ reason. For Toland and Voltaire after him, faith has 
become entirely supplanted by reason and banished from the realm of 
theological enquiry: ‘What is faith? Is it to believe what appears evident? No. 
It is evident to me that there is a necessary, eternal, intelligent being. This is 
not a matter of faith, but of reason’ (Voltaire 1971, 208). 
For Rousseau likewise: 
The greatest ideas of the divinity come to us from reason alone. 
View the spectacle of nature; hear the inner voice. Has God not 
told everything to our eyes, to our conscience, to our judgment? 
What more will men tell us? (Rousseau 1979, 295) 
Making Room: Kant 
The two eighteenth-century models of the relations between faith and 
reason—‘faith then reason’ and ‘no relation’—come together in the thought of 
Immanuel Kant, surely the most important background to any aspect of 
nineteenth-century Christian thought. On the one hand, Kant was famously 
roused from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume and by his insistence that 
knowledge begins (non-cognitively) with experience. On the other hand, Kant 
took from his rationalist training the conviction, drawn from Christian Wolff, 
that natural theology—the only kind of theology that was concerned with 
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questions of our knowledge of God—was defined as ‘the science of those 
things which are possible per Deum [for and through God]’ (Wolff 1736–37, 
pt. 1, 1). As a branch of metaphysics, natural theology had no place for faith or 
revelation, with the latter limited, in effect, to meaningless beliefs (Wolff 
insists that whilst divine revelation is indeed possible, ‘it is clear that God 
does not reveal anything which we can discover by reason’ (Wolff 1738, 624–
5), that is to say, anything that generates knowledge). Here, as elsewhere, 
Kant’s genius consisted in combining these two seemingly irreconcilable 
approaches to faith and reason into an unstable alternative that set the terms of 
the question for nineteenth-century Christian thinkers. 
In brief, Kant sought to accept the ‘no relation’ model of faith and 
reason in his critique of natural theology, and simultaneously to affirm a 
version of the ‘faith then reason’ model in his moral philosophy. Kant’s 
demolition of the natural theological arguments for the existence of God is 
well known and rightly marks a watershed in any discussion of Christian 
philosophy of religion. What is significant in the current context though is not 
so much Kant’s negative conclusion about our ability to come to knowledge of 
the existence of God through speculative (pure) reason, but rather that Kant is 
clear that theological questions—of our knowledge of the existence and nature 
of God—are properly matters of reason and not faith. For Kant—as for 
Wolff—divine revelation, though possible, is not the source of our knowledge 
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of God. Unlike Hume, at no point does Kant concede the role of faith as 
foundational to the Christian religion. And yet, of course, he famously 
‘den[ies] knowledge in order to make room for faith’ in the context of his 
explanation of his ‘moral turn’—namely, of his turn from speculative or 
theoretical reason to practical or moral reason as the means to come to 
knowledge of God through faith. 
For Kant, it is not revelation that grounds and enables theology, but 
practical reason. In the Conflict of the Faculties, in the course of 
distinguishing between the faculties (or disciplines) of theology and 
philosophy, Kant contrasts the ‘biblical theologian’, who is concerned with 
‘ecclesiastical faith’, with the ‘rational theologian’, whose concern is with 
‘religious faith’. For Kant, the biblical theologian’s authority is based upon his 
acceptance of the authority of divine revelation in Scripture (in other words, 
faith without knowledge), whereas the rational theologian’s authority is 
grounded in practical reason (or, rational faith): 
A rational theologian . . . is one versed in reason with regard to 
religious faith, which is based on inner laws that can be 
developed from every man’s own reason. The very concept of 
religion shows that it can never be based on decrees (no matter 
how high their source); for religion is not the sum of certain 
teachings regarded as divine revelations (that is called 
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theology), but the sum of all our duties regarded as divine 
commands. (Kant 1979, 61) 
 To return to the famous words from the preface of the second edition of The 
Critique of Practical Reason: through the turn to practical reason, Kant sought 
a way to make room for faith by going beyond knowledge but not beyond 
reason. The existence of God—the recognition of our moral duties as divine 
commands—is for Kant a necessary hypothesis (postulate of practical reason) 
that grounds the subjective certainty of faith; a faith that is a rational 
presupposition without being a praeambula fidei. Kant, we might say, 
combines the ‘no relation’ model (faith as assent to divine revelation has no 
epistemic status) and the ‘faith then reason’ model (faith is a presupposition 
for rational theology) whilst clearly rejecting the traditional ‘reason then faith’ 
model. In other words, what he endorses—and what he bequeaths to the 
nineteenth century—is a new model: one of ‘faith and reason’. 
‘Faith and Reason’ 
Maria Rosa Antognazza, in her own survey of reason and revelation in the 
eighteenth century, neatly summarizes the Kantian legacy for nineteenth-
century Christian thinkers as regards faith and reason: 
Supporters of natural theology might well have thought that 
[William] Paley’s valiant and seemingly successful efforts 
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opened the nineteenth century on a high note. By this time, 
however, plenty of people had reached the conclusion that, all 
considered, theoretical or speculative reason did not lead to 
God . . . Far from regarding reason as the source of truth which 
leads to salvation, a broad range of thinkers saw theoretical 
reason as structurally incapable of leading anywhere near the 
divine realm. Morality rather than dogmas and doctrines paved 
the way to God. (Antognazza 2014, 160) 
In this section I will trace the impact of this moral turn in establishing and 
cementing the new model of relation between faith and reason as ‘faith and 
reason’. Of course, not all nineteenth-century Christian thinkers explicitly 
endorsed this Kantian framework of theological enquiry, and exponents of the 
previously sketched models abounded. And yet, key nineteenth-century 
Christian thinkers, notably Schleiermacher, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and 
Nietzsche, are all to a great extent marked by their shared estimate of the 
relations between faith and reason as a composite conjunction of ‘faith and 
reason’ in ways that often belie their more (in)famous pronouncements on one 
or the other. 
‘Feeling of Absolute Dependence’: Schleiermacher 
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The impact of Kant’s vision of a moral faith that leads to God via practical 
reason is perhaps most clearly seen in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s insistence 
that theology, in order to be adequate to its subject matter (God), must take 
into account the role of the experiencing subject in its relation to the Absolute. 
For Schleiermacher, God cannot be an object of knowledge for human reason, 
as to make God into an object of cognition would be precisely to misidentify 
the reality of the divine as an object conditioned the human subject. Any 
object of knowledge becomes an object for a subject, and hence is placed in a 
conceptual space in which it can be compared to and differentiated from the 
knowing subject, as well as becoming subjected to the a priori conditions of 
consciousness. Therefore, Schleiermacher is clear: 
Any possibility of God being in any way given is entirely 
excluded, because anything that is outwardly given must be 
given as an object exposed to our counter influence, however 
slight that may be. The transference of the idea of God to any 
perceptible object . . . is always a corruption. (Schleiermacher 
1999, §4.4) 
Redolent with classic Protestant iconoclastic warnings against the human 
temptation to reverse Genesis 1:27 and fashion God after our own image, 
Schleiermacher’s warning against the claims of reason to be adequate to the 
task of responding to the divine (a concern repeated in the twentieth century in 
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starker terms in Paul Tillich’s insistence that God does not exist) does not, 
however, lead him to deny reason and turn to faith alone. Instead it is to a 
form of practical reason that itself expresses faith that Schleiermacher turns. 
For Schleiermacher, whilst we cannot speak directly of God (without thereby 
making God into an object of our subjectivity), we can—and must—speak of 
ourselves as conditioned by God. This awareness of our being conditioned is 
not itself an object of knowledge—we do not know that we are conditioned—
but is the ground or presupposition of all consciousness; it is what he calls 
‘immediate self-consciousness’, and it is identical with what he calls ‘God-
consciousness’. For Schleiermacher, this awareness of God that is at the same 
time our self-awareness is faith, the ground of all religion, or, as it is better 
known, ‘the feeling of absolute dependence’. To be clear, Schleiermacher 
insists that whilst this feeling must accompany all moments of consciousness 
(since it is that which grounds self-consciousness itself), what is given to 
consciousness is not a direct consciousness of God but rather a consciousness 
of the self as absolutely dependent, in particular regarding the self’s own 
spontaneous activity in the world—in other words, its freedom or, in Kantian 
terms, moral autonomy. Precisely because consciousness of God is not given 
directly in immediate self-consciousness but is nonetheless coincident upon 
the consciousness of the self as absolutely dependent, this feeling is described 
by Schleiermacher as faith. God is not known or knowable through reason; 
Page 21 of 38 
 
rather, God’s existence and nature are necessary postulates of the activity 
reason: ‘The transcendental ground precedes and succeeds all actual thinking, 
but does not come to an appearance at any time. This transcendental ground of 
thought accompanies the actual thinking in an atemporal manner, but never 
itself becomes thought’ (Schleiermacher 2002, 568). 
For Schleiermacher, faith and reason are co-dependent; all human 
reasoning is ventured on the gesture of making room for faith. 
‘Faith and Knowledge’: Hegel 
No one more explicitly endorsed the model of ‘faith and reason’ than Hegel, 
whose 1802 article ‘Faith and Knowledge’ underlined their composite 
relation, even as he took issue with the particulars of Kant’s account. Hegel, in 
this article, takes Kant to task for failing to recognize the full potential of 
Kant’s own account of reason (as intellectual intuition) to accommodate (or 
make room for) faith without having thereby to deny knowledge. Whilst God, 
for Kant, is not an object of knowledge but of ethical faith, for Hegel it is 
precisely because our knowledge of God is a participation in God’s own self-
knowledge that God is at the same time an object of knowledge and an object 
of faith. 
He [Hegel] differs from Kant in that for Kant, the ‘reason’ that asserts 
intellectual intuition differs from the intellectual intuition it asserts, and thus 
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asserts it as it were ‘from outside,’ or from the point of view of man. As a 
result, the assertion remains, in its cognitive use, a merely regulative maxim 
for both determinant and reflective judgements; and in its practical use, it is a 
postulate or belief. For Hegel, on the other hand, the ‘reason’ that asserts 
intellectual intuition is intellectual intuition itself: God’s knowledge. This 
means that God’s knowledge is accessible to finite consciousness 
(Longuenesse 2000, 263). 
What Hegel argues, in effect, is that Kant does not sufficiently 
recognize the implications of his critical idealism. For Hegel, Kant rightly 
rejects the claims of speculative reason to provide us with knowledge of God; 
as Hegel famously affirms in his later Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 
(1822–23): 
We know, to be precise, that God does not offer himself for 
observation, that he cannot be perceived through the external 
experience of the senses as a given thing or object, but also that 
he cannot be found in inward experience, as experience of 
ourselves. Outside there is the natural world; inwardly there is 
our world, where we are. What we find in this inner experience 
is therefore our subjectivity, our finite subjective activity apart 
from God. In this perspective God is neither within us nor 
outside us. (Hegel 2007, 167) 
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And yet, Hegel avers that Kant is wrong thereby to deny any possibility of 
knowledge of God, especially given Kant’s own recognition that moral faith is 
not a fideistic wager but a requirement of (practical) reason. What Kant fails 
to appreciate, according to Hegel, is that the God postulated by Kant at the end 
of his philosophy belongs instead at the beginning of all philosophy as its only 
content: 
The highest idea which [Kantian philosophy] happened upon in 
its critical occupation, and which it treated as an empty 
lubrication and an unnatural scholastic trick which consists in 
extracting reality from concepts, it then posits, but at the end of 
philosophy, as a postulate which is supposed to have subjective 
necessity, but not the absolute objectivity which would lead us 
to begin philosophy with it and acknowledge it as the only 
content of philosophy, instead of ending with it, in faith. (Hegel 
1977, 67) 
For Hegel, philosophy should begin with and as faith: God is not so much 
posited as the conclusion of reason as accepted as the necessary precondition 
of thought, which whilst never ‘about’ God as an object is nonetheless ‘the 
presentation of God, as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of 
nature and of a finite spirit’ (Hegel 1976, 50). Of course, this does not mean 
that Hegel’s God is to be equated to the classical Boethian deity in possession 
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tota simul of eternal simplicity anymore than with Kant’s ideal of the ens 
realissimum. Hegel’s God has as eternal essence the Trinitarian ‘spiritual 
activity’ that creates out of nothing, which is to say, out of God’s self. This is 
not the divine actus purus attainable by scholastic trickery but the living God 
whose very being consists in the eternal Trinitarian movement of externalizing 
himself, interiorizing what has been externalized, and remaining in all these 
identical with himself. 
‘Faith with Reason’: Kierkegaard 
Søren Kierkegaard’s thought was more influential on twentieth-century 
Christian thinkers than in his own day; yet nonetheless, Kierkegaard’s own 
distinctive approach supports the characteristic general nineteenth-century 
model of the relations between faith and reason as ‘faith and reason’. For 
Kierkegaard, Hegel is correct in his assertion that philosophy must begin in 
faith and take as its ‘first and only content’ the highest idea (God); and yet, 
Kierkegaard worries that Hegel can only escape the Kantian constraint of 
taking God as an idea by overstepping the possibilities of temporal human 
subjectivity. For Hegel, philosophy combines with faith when it accepts that 
absolute knowledge is not a product of the human subject but is the knowledge 
that God has of God-self. However, Kierkegaard wonders: 
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Of what help is it to explain how the eternal truth is to be 
understood eternally when the one to use the explanation is 
prevented from understanding it in this way because he is 
existing, and is merely a fantast if he fancies himself to be sub 
specie aeterni? (Kierkegaard 1992, 192) 
For Kierkegaard, Hegel’s knowledge of the Absolute is a delusion: not 
because God can never be an object of knowledge but because the subject is 
never be able to grasp eternal metaphysical truths. Instead, for Kierkegaard, 
the subject exists in time and as such is always in motion, always becoming, 
directed towards its future. Reason yearns for abstract timeless truth, and 
Hegel aims to show that we have the capacity for universal thought because of 
our participation in the eternal becoming of the Absolute. For Kierkegaard, by 
contrast, Hegel’s ambition obscures the essentially relational character of our 
knowledge of God. We, as finite temporal subjects, can never hold the eternal 
truth; however, for Kierkegaard, this does not mean that we cannot be in a 
relation to such truth. Such a relation to truth does not come about through an 
examination of the objects of our subjective consciousness (this much Hegel 
would agree with), but through a recognition of the incompleteness of the 
subject in its infinite striving, or what Kierkegaard in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript calls ‘infinite passion’. An individual finds God 
‘subjectively’: ‘not by virtue of any objective deliberation, but by virtue of the 
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infinite passion of inwardness’ (Kierkegaard 1992, 200). This, for 
Kierkegaard, is not to abandon reason (as the portrayal of Kierkegaard as 
fideistic caricature wholly misrepresents); but it is to bring reason and faith 
together. Existential human reason is—or ought to be—passionate. 
Just as Schleiermacher defined faith (or piety) as ‘the consciousness of 
being absolutely dependent, or which is the same thing, of being in relation to 
God’ (Schleiermacher 1999, §4), so Kierkegaard stresses that our being in 
relation to God is a (faithful) requirement of reason. The recognition and 
acceptance that our knowledge of God as a subjective relation is both 
necessarily incomplete and a necessary precondition for any ‘objective’ 
knowledge is basic to Kierkegaard’s thought. His term for this composition of 
faith and reason is paradox: ‘we can know truth through the absolute paradox, 
which unites faith with reason.’ (Kierkegaard 1980, 526) 
Here again we must be careful not to leap too quickly to a fideistic 
interpretation of Kierkegaard. It is not faith that is the absolute paradox but its 
unity with reason. What is absurd, according to Kierkegaard, is that faith and 
reason do belong together, in spite of the temptations of both separately to 
deny the other. For example, in Fear and Trembling it is the knight of infinite 
resignation—not the knight of faith—who gives up on all she loves most in 
the world, so much so that she is never at home in the world again. It is 
infinite resignation that is fideistic. By contrast, the knight of faith can return 
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to the world after the movement of infinite resignation and take delight once 
again in earthly things, much to the bafflement of the knight of infinite 
resignation. It seems that the knight of faith denies reason through faith and 
yet instead it is precisely the knight of faith who is able—paradoxically—‘to 
express the sublime in the pedestrian absolutely’ (Kierkegaard 1985, 70). By 
affirming the ordinary, the knight of faith confirms that the religious 
transcendence of the ethical (the domain of universal reason) leads to its 
teleological suspension and not its annihilation. Faith and reason belong 
together in the individual—that is what is so scandalous, according to 
Kierkegaard. 
‘Faith in Reason’: Nietzsche 
It may seem surprising to include Friedrich Nietzsche in an account of the 
characteristic model of the relations between faith and reason in nineteenth-
century Christian thought, given his vehement rejection of Christianity (and by 
implication the accuracy of its claims to knowledge of God). Indeed, 
Nietzsche is clear in his dismissal of the claims of the Christian theologians, as 
in this statement from Antichrist: ‘Whatever a theologian feels to be true must 
be false: this is almost a criterion of truth’ (Nietzsche 1971, 576). Yet, as the 
allusion to Schleiermacher suggests, Nietzsche is keenly aware that faith and 
reason cannot be held apart from one another—after all, how could the 
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feelings of the theologians be either true or false if they were merely a matter 
of subjective faith? Indeed, it is central to Nietzsche’s whole body of work to 
expose, in a way that he argues has not sufficiently been recognized, the 
conjunction of faith and reason. As part of doing so, he takes aim at many of 
the claims of establishment Christianity (in which he had much common cause 
with Kierkegaard), precisely because he discerns in religion a tendency to 
obscure the deep-seated identity of faith and reason in the promotion of an 
irrational piousness or an irrational scientism. For Nietzsche, our finite 
existence is marked not only by temporality but also by instinctual drives that 
put us into a situation of irresolvable conflict, not only with our environment 
and those we encounter, but also with ourselves: ‘Animosity, cruelty, the 
pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying—all this was pitted 
against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of “bad 
conscience”’ (Nietzsche 2006, 57). 
This alienation from our own animal instincts is, for Nietzsche, the 
birth of self-consciousness, through which process we become aware of 
ourselves—not as absolutely dependent but as absolutely contested. According 
to Nietzsche, religion was offered as balm to this necessary sickness, with the 
priests projecting God as ‘the ultimate antithesis . . . to his real and 
irredeemable animal instincts’ (Nietzsche 2006, 63). However, Nietzsche 
claims that the cure was far worse than the illness: in affirming God, the 
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priests invite us to deny ourselves. Theology, then, is nihilism; the affirmation 
of God is the nihilation of human finitude. As such, Nietzsche’s rejection of 
religious theism chimes with Kierkegaard’s rejection of Hegel’s confidence in 
our ability to know the eternal truth. Nietzsche’s denial of God puts in 
question the therapeutic (or salvific) character of the very idea that truth 
requires a break from our finite subjectivity in the attainment of an impossible 
‘view from nowhere’. For Nietzsche, it is only because of the interdependence 
of faith and reason that we can be misled into thinking that saving knowledge 
(i.e., knowledge of the existence and nature of God) can come from the denial 
of our subjective existence; indeed that we need to be saved at all. 
Importantly, Nietzsche insists that his diagnosis applies as much to modern 
science as it does to the Christian religion. The person who affirms that 
science has sole access to the truth ‘affirms another world from the one of life, 
nature and history’ and must ‘deny its opposite, this world, our world’ 
(Nietzsche 2006, 112). It is faith and reason working together that justify the 
false confidence in science: ‘our faith in science is still based on a 
metaphysical faith’ (Nietzsche 2006, 112). Science, just as much as religion, 
combines faith and reason to pass judgement on our world and to find it 
wanting. 
For Nietzsche, faith and reason belong inextricably together, even 
when we do not acknowledge their coexistence. In both religion and science, 
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faith and reason work together in antithesis to life: it is only by being 
‘metaphysical faiths’ that religion and science can persuade and insidiously 
undermine our humanity. In other words, it is only because both creeds feel 
reasonable that they command our allegiance. This recognition, however, 
enables us to overcome religious and scientific nihilism in an embrace of our 
finitude. For Nietzsche, such perspectivism is not a rejection of faith and 
reason, but an acknowledgement of their identity. Indeed, the passage from 
Genealogy of Morality quoted earlier continues: 
[W]e godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire from the 
blaze set alight by a faith thousands of years old, that faith of 
the Christians, which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth, 
that truth is divine . . . But what if precisely this becomes more 
and more unbelievable . . . and what if God himself turned out 
to be our oldest lie? (Nietzsche 2006, 112–13) 
Part of the reason, of course, why for Nietzsche the death of God, though a 
past occurrence, also still lies in the future is that theology (i.e., that Christian 
faith that was also the faith of Plato) lies at the very foundations of Western 
thinking itself: 
Much less may one suppose that many people know as yet what 
this event really means—and how much must collapse now that 
this faith has been undermined because it was built on this 
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faith, propped up by it, grown into it; for example the whole of 
our European morality. (Nietzsche 2001, 199) 
More importantly still, Nietzsche suggests that the theological is lodged even 
within the very ways of thinking that philosophy makes use of in its attempt to 
think through the death of God: ‘“Reason” in language—oh, what an old 
deceptive female she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still 
have faith in grammar’ (Nietzsche 2005, 170). 
What Nietzsche recognizes here is that faith and reason are too 
intimately intertwined to enable a true atheism, even in the wake of God’s 
death. Nietzsche’s alternative, then, is perhaps the attempt to do without both 
faith and reason; to take up a position somehow outside of grammar. Not to 
dissolve the composite pair of faith and reason—that would be impossible—
but rather to attempt to leave them both behind in the stance of a truly godless 
anti-metaphysician who believes nothing, who values nothing, and who knows 
nothing. Perhaps this is the promise of the eternal recurrence of the same: the 
‘greatest weight’ to those seeking eternal truth but a gift to those ‘well 
disposed’ enough to life and to themselves ‘to long for nothing more fervently 
than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal’ (Nietzsche 2001, 195). 
Such is the entanglement of faith and reason for Nietzsche. 
‘Faith or Reason’ 
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This chapter has presented the model of the relations between faith and reason 
in nineteenth-century Christian thought as ‘faith and reason’, as distinct from 
the previously dominant models of ‘reason then faith’, ‘faith then reason’, and 
‘no relation’. By discussing Schleiermacher, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and 
Nietzsche, I have sought to highlight how these very different nineteenth-
century Christian thinkers share a common model of the relations of faith and 
reason as ‘faith and reason’, even as they disagree radically with each other. 
That these four are characteristic of nineteenth-century Christian thought has 
been assumed and does, admittedly, reflect a certain (German) parochialism. 
Of course, a full account of the relations between faith and reason in this 
period would need to engage not only with English and French Christian 
thinkers, but also widen its horizons within and beyond Europe. 
Notwithstanding, I suggest that the voices surveyed in this chapter are 
representative of the determining characteristic of nineteenth-century Christian 
thought about the relation between faith and reason—largely on account of 
their influence on subsequent discussions and the accepted historiography of 
the century that their early twentieth-century interpreters established in the 
course of the development of their own characteristic model of the relations 
between faith and reason. 
In brief, I suggest that twentieth-century accounts of the relation 
between faith and reason are characterized by a rejection of the synthetic 
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composite accounts of the nineteenth century. Whereas for Schleiermacher, 
Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche faith and reason are held unavoidably 
together, for the Christian thinkers who determined the intellectual character 
of the twentieth century, faith and reason are more frequently held in 
opposition as an either/or disjunctive pair. 
In part, I suggest this is due to a general rejection of nineteenth-century 
Christian thought in the early twentieth. In the situation of perceived moral 
and intellectual crisis leading up to and following the First World War, 
Christian thinkers looked elsewhere than their immediate predecessors for new 
answers to apparently new questions. For some this meant a retrieval of pre-
modern theology (as in Protestant neo-Orthodoxy and Catholic neo-
Scholasticism and later nouvelle théologie), for others it consisted in a re-
engagement with the seminal thinkers of modernity itself (as in the ‘back to 
Kant’ slogan of neo-Kantian philosophy). At the same time the early twentieth 
century was marked by the establishment of the experimental sciences as the 
dominant paradigm of epistemic authority. In light of the success of ‘modern 
science’, a new form of philosophy took shape, which would evolve into the 
‘analytic’ tradition, and which wasted little time in allocating claims to 
knowledge about the existence and nature of God to the realm of the strictly 
meaningless. Even for those philosophers who remained consciously indebted 
to their nineteenth-century forebears, the coincidence of faith and reason was 
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held to be profoundly problematic. Martin Heidegger’s project of overcoming 
metaphysics as onto-theology is precisely a commitment to a kind of 
disciplinary purity that distinguishes and separates out faith (theology as the 
positive science of revelation) and reason (philosophy as fundamental 
ontology). There are, of course, exceptions, notably Paul Tillich, Ernst Bloch, 
and those associated with the Frankfurt School—indeed it is notable that 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s 1944 The Dialectic of Enlightenment was at heart a 
critique of the twentieth-century thinkers’ mistaken attempts to hold faith and 
reason apart, and their failure to recognize their entanglement, with tragic 
consequences. 
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